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Abstract 
We study school choice within the family, analyzing how birth order, gender, innate talent, 
and family financial restrictions impact the parents´ decision to prioritize the education of 
one or more of the children over the rest. We find that parents, particularly from lower 
income homes, are more likely to select more prestigious, higher cost schools for their 
eldest child, male children and the most talented children. This behavior may explain part 
of the positive “male bias” in learning and may have a relevant impact on income 
distribution among family members.   
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1 Introduction 
 
Educational decisions can be analyzed within the theoretical framework of human 
capital, which views education to be an investment influencing productivity and 
salaries (Schultz, 1960; Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Deciding to be a student, at 
what intensity to study, and with what level of quality, impacts lifelong salary 
projections. The decision families make regarding school choice for their children 
therefore has a lifelong impact.  
Human capital theory derives a set of predictions, including that most 
education occurs when a person is young; that education will decline as the cost of 
education increases; and that it will drop as the gap between the income levels of 
people with and without education is reduced.  
The theory of human capital suggests that families will make the optimal 
decision regarding their children´s education so as to maximize total income. These 
decisions may coincide with increasing or reducing the gap in personal income 
distribution inside the household. The human capital theory competes with theories 
which suggest discrimination (positive or negative) on behalf of the parents and 
that these biases may not be related to return on investment. Furthermore, people 
cannot give their human capital as collateral, so liquidity restrictions may be 
particularly severe and limit access to education.  
This paper analyzes empirically family school choice decisions related to the 
quality of the schools, using two different measures: academic test scores, and 
tuition costs. Our objective is to determine school and family factors that make 
parents differentiate the schooling selected for their children. This topic is 
important because i) some of the existing literature cast doubts on the parents´ 
ability to select complex aspects related to school quality; ii) the existence of a 
gender bias in learning favoring males could be explained in part if families favor 
males, and iii) favoring some children in the family would have a direct impact on 
earning ability and future personal income distribution. 
When evaluating schooling decisions in households with more than one child, 
it is possible to discern if the household follows a selection process which drives 
parents to give preferential treatment to specific children so they can attend better 
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quality schools. If these decisions are based on an economic rationale derived from 
a distribution of innate abilities, these decisions could accentuate inequities in the 
distribution of personal income.  If this is the case, it is likely that households will 
create mechanisms for income transfer in the future. These considerations are 
critically important, and should be considered when creating social policies, for 
example. 
This article is structured in four sections, in addition to this introduction. 
Section 2 outlines a brief description of Chile´s situation, and a discussion of 
international literature on the topic. Section 3 provides a simple theoretical 
motivation for the empirical estimations. Section 4 includes a brief discussion of the 
databases used. Section 5 includes the results and finally Section 6 holds the 
conclusion.   
 
2 Background 
 
2.1 The Case of Chile 
 
In 1981, Chile implemented an important reform of its educational system, when 
State run educational schools were transferred to the municipalities. Likewise, the 
system of financing was modified; it was originally based on historical costs, but it 
then changed to financing with a subsidy based on student enrollment, and 
students now having complete freedom of choice as to which school they want to 
attend (Paredes & Ugarte, 2011). These reforms created an increase in school 
coverage, but have had little impact on the quality of education.  
There are many who have criticized the decentralization process (Muñoz and 
Raczynski, 2007), who suggests that the process was too limited. On the other side, 
Beyer (2009) argues that the decentralization was not complete, since the 
establishments stopped reporting to the central government, but the municipalities 
were not provided with the necessary capabilities to be able to administer them. 
Also, in response to the economic crisis which started in 1981, the budget for public 
education was sharply reduced; between 1982 and 1990, public spending in 
education fell by 29%. 
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Prior to 1988, Chile had no system in place to evaluate the quality of 
education. In that year, the System for the Measurement of Quality of Education, 
referred to as the SIMCE test, was created and it is still being used. At first, the 
results of these tests were not publically available, but they began to be published 
in 1995 (Gomez, Chumacero, and Paredes, 2011). 
In 1990, the National Education Law was implemented, establishing 
minimum wages for teachers and a set of controls for educational entities regarding 
the transfer and firing of teachers. In 1991, schools with public financing were 
allowed to complement their State funding with tuition paid by parents. This 
became an important source of income for private schools, something that 
drastically reduced the enrollment in public schools (see Paredes and Pinto, 2009). 
In 2008 there were 11,905 educational establishments, of which 49% were public, 
44% were subsidized private school, and 6% were private schools (Educational 
Statistics 2008, MINEDUC). 
As a result, Chile in 2011 has an educational system with the largest 
coverage of students with vouchers, making the analysis of school choice 
particularly relevant, as well as offering increased possibilities for empirical 
analysis. 
 
2.2 School Choice 
 
The literature regarding school choice is closely tied to the idea that competition 
would impact school management, given that it would drive academic performance 
in order to capture “clients.”  Studies regarding school choice have been focused on 
counties and cities in the United States (Hastings et al., 2006; Hastings and 
Weinstein, 2007) and only recently have captured experiences of less developed 
countries, such as Chile which is particularly relevant due to the coverage of the 
voucher system (Gertler and Glewwe, 1989 for Peru; Alderman et al. 2001 for 
Pakistan; Gallego and Hernando, 2008 and Chumacero, Gomez and Paredes, 2011 
for Chile).  
In the end, the question is about the impact that school choice have on 
academic performance. In the case of the United States, Hoxby (1994) found that 
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greater private school competition significantly raised the quality of public schools, 
as measured by the educational achievement, wages, and high school graduation 
rates of public school students. Hoxby (2000) finds that areas with greater 
opportunities for choice among public schools have lower per-pupil spending, lower 
teacher salaries, and larger classes. The same areas have better average student 
performance, as measured by students' educational achievement, teachers’ wages, 
and test scores.  
Rouse (1998), referring only to Milwaukee, suggested that the Parental 
Choice Program seems to have had a positive effect on math achievement in 
attending a private school, but had no benefits for reading scores. Bayer and 
McMillan (2005) measure competition as an elasticity which represents how a 
reduction in quality would affect school demand. They find a significantly positive 
relationship between competition and scores with data of an urban area in the 
USA (see, Braun-Munzinger, 2005, for a review). With an emphasis on theory, 
Epple and Romano (1998, 2002) developed a model of competition between private 
and public schools in a system based on vouchers. They concluded that this system 
promotes the growth of private schools, increases sorting, and tends to benefit 
high-ability students.  
Regarding the Chilean case, Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) compared changes of 
rural and urban schools, assuming that competition, measured by the entrance of 
the new voucher-funded private schools, was less intense in rural than in urban 
areas. They concluded that the voucher system did not improve school performance 
and that, in turn, it produced sorting. They also argued that competition may not 
have had an effect on performance because of the way parents choose schools. 
Gallego and Hernando (2008) tested the existence of a positive relationship 
between competition and school performance, and whether this relationship is more 
important for private voucher schools than for public schools. Using cross-section 
regressions to explain SIMCE scores with a national competition index measured as 
the proportion of students in each county who attend private schools, as well as 
other socioeconomic variables, and he found support for both hypotheses. Auguste 
and Valenzuela (2004) also found a positive effect of competition on schools’ results 
and concluded that competition increased the sorting of students between public 
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and private schools, based on students’ family income. More recently, Chumacero, 
Gallegos and Paredes (2011) through a critical review of the literature, proposed a 
different methodology to define market scope and found a strong impact of 
competition on the results of private and public schools.   
 
2.3 Literature on family choice 
 
Literature regarding economic decisions within the family started with Becker 
(1964). Since then, an extensive list of papers has focused on studying how families 
allocate their efforts and resources among different family members. According to 
Becker (1982), we can assume that parents are altruistic regarding their children, 
though theory and evidence show that they do not necessarily allocate the same 
investment to each of them. This is explained in part by the differences in 
capabilities and needs of the children, as well as characteristics of the home, or 
both.   
A theoretical model which explains inter-family investments based on 
economic theory is Horowitz and Wang (2004). The results suggest that parents 
maximize the total value of the investment in their children´s education up to the 
point where marginal growth in human capital is equal among them. Therefore, the 
investment could be concentrated in the most capable. Then, after maximizing the 
combined product, the family redistributes the income among those with more and 
less education.   
In case that there were not transferences among family members once each 
of the members has received his/her education, then economic theory predicts that 
parents will equalize the marginal utility of the returns on investment of their 
children. In this case, the family would exert an “equalizing” or compensating 
effect for the different abilities, and the children in the household would be equally 
educated, even when it is inefficient since the most capable will study less.  Even 
when children are equally capable, there are economic reasons that can explain 
why, under certain circumstances, parents would provide differentiated education 
for their children. Dahan and Gaviria (1998) developed a model which, as a result 
of income restrictions, poor parents do not educate all of their children, while rich 
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parents educate all of them, and middle class parents educate some of them at the 
expense of all of the other children.  
In a society which discriminates by gender, parents may decide to invest 
more in their male children. Behrman (1988) developed a model to analyze 
differences in health among children within a family. The model considered that 
parents will maximize utility subject to budget restrictions and to restrictions 
associated with a production function reflecting health. He found a pro-male bias, 
that could reflect a bias toward male children as well as a difference in health care 
returns favoring male children.  
Alisjahbana (1998) also found evidence of biases within the home, favoring 
male children in the case of student enrollment. This study used information from 
Indonesia, showing that families are more likely to choose to provide more years of 
public school education and higher education for their male children. Ejrnaes and 
Portner (2004), in a similar study, used birth order to analyze differences in 
parental decisions regarding their children´s educational level.  
Afridi (2005) analyzed intra-family negotiation processes using data from 
India, and found that the economic autonomy of the mother had a significant 
impact on the resulting gap between boys and girls.  The mother’s level of 
education also had particular impact on girls´ education, versus the impact of the 
father´s educational level.   
Khanam (2008) used a multinomial logit model to analyze reasons for only 
attending school, only working, combining both or doing neither. Controlling for 
social demographic variables, he found that girls are more likely to attend school 
than boys, and children who arrive into a family, versus biological children, are 
more likely to work. 
Thomas (1990) developed a model based on Becker (1964) and evaluated the 
impact of subsidies in the hands of fathers and mothers on the investment in their 
children, measured by nutritional results. The study found that mothers favored 
their daughter’s nutrition, while fathers favored their sons. Emerson and Portela 
(2007) used a multiprobit model where the dependent variable was if the child 
works or not, and studies or not. They found that the educational levels of the 
fathers and mothers had a measurable impact on the probabilities. Contreras and 
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Rubalcava (2000) found evidence of specialization by gender regarding nutritional 
results. They found that mothers provided more resources for their daughters and 
fathers for their sons, and that in total, the father´s education is less relevant than 
the mother´s education in explaining the family health situation.  
While the literature suggests that there is a bias in the investment of human 
capital toward male children and the eldest child, there are no studies that have 
approached the topic of school choice and specifically the choice on quality of 
school with the context of family decisions. Chile is particularly relevant for a 
study of this type because, as said above, since 1981 there has been a widespread 
system of educational vouchers. Likewise, the debate regarding income distribution, 
where Chile  is one of the most unequal in the world, has focused on the role of 
public policy, with little emphasis thus far on decisions at the family level. 
 
3 A simple model 
 
As discussed above, decisions regarding the use of scarce resources within the 
household depend on the interaction of preferences and technology. In particular, 
egalitarian or differentiated provision of education to siblings in a household will 
depend on whether or not inter-personal transfers are likely to occur. 
 This section presents a simple theoretical model that highlights most of the 
features of the empirical model presented in Section 5. Although more elements 
could be added, the model developed here derives the main implications of the 
relevant literature, and provides explanations for the empirical results found.  
 Consider a household that has two siblings (denoted by 1 and 2) and that is 
interested in maximizing the utility function: 
 ( )1 2, ,u y y  (1) 
where iy  corresponds to the income generated by sibling i, which is determined 
by:1 
 ( ), , ,i i i iy f a x s=  (2) 
                                                          
1 The utility function could also depend on the consumption of the parents, but the main results 
derived will not be affected by ignoring this choice. 
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where a denotes the level of innate ability, s is the level of expenditure in 
education, and x is a vector of other characteristics that determine the income. It is 
assumed that f is increasing in a and s. 
 The household’s budget constraint is given by: 
 1 22 ,m s s s= ³ +  (3) 
where m is the maximum amount of income that the household intends to spend on 
education of both siblings, with s  being the average maximum expenditure on 
education. 
 Furthermore, for reasons that will be made apparent briefly, assume that the 
minimum level of spending on the education each sibling ( )s  must satisfy: 
 ,is s³  (4) 
with s  being non-negative.  
 The household has to choose the amounts of s1 and s2 that maximize (1) 
subject to (2)-(5). 
 The first order conditions of the problem lead to: 
 1 21 2
1 1 2 2
,
u y u y
y e y e
l l¶ ¶ ¶ ¶+ = +¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  (5) 
where il  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with each constraint in (4). 
 To determine the optimal amounts of education for each sibling and how 
they are affected by the exogenous variables, one has to impose more structure. 
The most relevant of which has to do with how households value efficiency versus 
equality. 
 First consider the case in which the household values efficiency.2 For that 
purpose, let the utility function be of the form: 
 ( ) ( ) 1 21 2, ;  ,2
y y
u y y g z z
+= =  
where g is increasing in z. In this case, households maximize a function of the total 
income generated by both siblings.  
 As a stylized example, and to arrive to analytical solutions for the optimal 
level of expenditures on education, let ( ) .g z z=  Furthermore, consider the 
following functional form for f in (2): 
                                                          
2 As stressed above, this does not preclude inter-personal arrangements among household members 
afterwards. 
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 ( ), , ,  0< 1.i i i i i i iy f a x s a x sa a= = £  
 Assuming interior solutions, the optimal levels of expenditure for each 
sibling are: 
 
1
1
2 2
1 2
1 1
,  ,  .
1 1
Am m a x
s s A
A A a x
a-é ùê ú= = = ê ú+ + ë û
 
 Thus, the level of expenditure on a child is increasing in the total income of 
the household, increasing in its own ability and decreasing in the ability of the 
sibling. The same holds for the other characteristics (x). That is, if the siblings are 
(for example) male and female, and the household considers that there is a wage 
premium for the male, it would “pay” the invest more on the education of the male 
child. On the other hand, other things equal, as the older child could presumably 
enter the labor market earlier, if the household has a discount factor that is less 
than unity, it would privilege the expenditure on the older sibling. 
 This simple model leads to a linear relationship between expenditure and 
income (m). However, nonlinearities are easily introduced in this same framework. 
For example, consider the case in which one of the constraints in (4) is binding. In 
such case, the household would invest the minimum amount of the education of the 
sibling that has the lower aixi, being independent of m. On the other hand, an 
upper bound on the level of expenditure of both siblings would also generate the 
nonlinearity. Needless to say, if preferences were not linear (as presented in this 
example) and/or the technologies in (2) were different among siblings, a non-
monotonic relationship would also arise. 
 For completeness, consider a polar case in which the household solely cares 
about the equality of incomes of the siblings and let the utility function could be of 
the form: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2
1 2, ;  ,2
y y
u y y g z z
-= =  
where now g is decreasing in z. In this case, households minimize a function that 
penalizes the disparities of income among siblings. 
 Assuming the same technology as before, and letting ( ) ,g z z= -  it is trivial 
to verify that now expenditures on one sibling are non-increasing in their ability 
and increasing on the ability of the other siblings. Thus, the household uses the 
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education as a means to compensate for lower ability or lower expected earnings 
due to other characteristics. In this polar example, as the households cares only 
about inequality it may be optimal to provide the minimum amount of education 
to the child with higher i ia x  and spend on education of the other sibling until the 
incomes are equated. 
 Although several additions to the model would render it to be more realistic, 
simple as it is, it provides a clear means to evaluate the determinants of schooling 
among siblings. If parents care more about efficiency (with inter personal transfers 
not precluded), they will tend to invest more on the education of the child with 
more ability and higher expect returns due to other factors. The next sections use a 
novel data base to evaluate this hypothesis empirically. 
 
4 Data 
 
There has not been an analysis of the interaction of family characteristics, family 
school choice decisions within the family and school performance. The CASEN 
database [National Socioeconomic Survey] allowed us to identify decisions regarding 
the type of school chosen for children, since it identifies siblings. However it does 
not have information regarding the children´s performance on standardized tests. 
On the other hand, the SIMCE database allowed us to identify performance and 
household characteristics of each student, but it is not connected to school choice 
between siblings.  
To relate both aspects, we created a database starting with university 
entrance exams (Spanish acronym PSU) for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. These 
databases have the student´s national identification number (Spanish acronym 
RUT) as well as the mother´s RUT. Using the three PSU databases, we could 
identify if two or more children of the same mother took the university entrance 
exam between the years of 2004 and 2006. 
Nearly without exception, students who took the PSU exam in a given year, 
for example 2006, were in 10th grade two years prior (in the year 2004), and 
therefore they took the standardized tests during that school year. Using the 
national ID number, we combined the PSU and SIMCE databases for all students 
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who were identified as children of the same mother, or “siblings.” More specifically, 
we combined the information of students who took the PSU exam between 2004 
and 2006 with standardized SIMCE test results for students who were in 10th grade 
between 2001 and 2003, and SIMCE test results taken by 8th grade students in 
2000.3   
  
5 Results 
 
As indicated in sections 2 and 3, there are different theoretical models which 
provide predictions regarding household behavior with respect to school choice for 
children. These models typically combine assumptions regarding how parents value 
the future of their children (altruism), with evaluations the parents make regarding 
the innate “talents” of their children, their ability to transform education into 
future income (for example through school choice) and the interpersonal 
arrangements done within the family (for example, the distribution of inheritance 
or future wealth transferences between siblings). This section includes an empirical 
estimation of the factors determining school choice in households where there are 
two siblings.  
          One important decision in this empirical approach was the choice of the 
dependent variable which described the parent´s preference associated with school 
choice. We evaluated multiple options for this variable that can characterize the 
family’s choice to send siblings to significantly different schools in regards to 
dimensions which will impact the human capital investment. We considered two 
dimensions: i) the tuition paid by the parents to the school, and ii) the 
performance of the school. If a difference in any of these variables favoring one of 
the siblings exists, it would indicate the family favors him or her. 
          We find interesting to analyze both variables, since it is possible that 
tuition may not perfectly correlate with the quality of the school, or at least not 
the quality that is the goal of public policy. Furthermore, parents may consider 
                                                          
3 Since the student must have taken the PSU in order to link the databases, by design, the database excludes 
individuals who dropped out of school or finished school but did not take the PSU exam, which could imply 
under representation of lower income groups, but that doesn’t necessarily skew the results.  
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performance in their school choice for their children (an explicitly important 
variable in policy design for vouchers), but they also may take into consideration 
sports facilities, English instruction, and possibly other factors that are not 
necessarily a priority for the public policy decision maker. In fact, some of the 
latter variables that parents may favor could actually have the opposite impact on 
performance or be directly opposed to the some public policy objectives (ie. social 
selectivity).   
         Specifically, we considered that for household i, with two children who took 
the university entrance exam during the specified period, the variable of interest is 
defined as:  
 
1 2
1 2
1 if 
,
0 if 
i i
i
i i
s s
y
s s
d
d
ìï - >ïï= íï - £ïïî
 (6) 
where jis  is tuition or the average SIMCE score of the school where student j, from 
household i, attends, and d  is the value of the difference between these variables 
where the schools where each sibling attends are of substantially different quality. 
Specifically, for each pair of siblings, we arranged the tuition and the SIMCE score 
associated with the school they attended, so as to always create a non negative 
difference.4 Then, we considered different values for the threshold d  which define 
the minimum significant difference. This parameter has a conceptual and empirical 
justification in the absence of statistical controls and switching costs (see 
Chumacero, Gallegos, and Paredes 2011b). Therefore, we defined a variable where 
the family chooses or does not choose to send the siblings to schools that are 
different in terms of the quality.  
 As discussed above, there are several theories regarding school choice. For 
example, some of the literature indicates the possible presence of a bias favoring 
males, where the family prefers that the son attend the best school, which is 
particularly relevant in cases where there is a binding family budget restriction. 
When a difference between siblings is detected, it may not be due to an overt bias; 
it may also be the result of the idea that women have access to other means of 
                                                          
4 Of course, if both siblings attend the same school, this variable would take the value of 0, 
regardless of the person’s characteristics. 
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obtaining future income. To define the impact of the gender of the student who 
attends the best school, we created a dummy variable Dh, which is valued at 1 
when the child attending the best school is a boy.  
 There are also studies in the literature that indicate the possible existence of 
a bias toward the eldest son of the household. This would mean that, 
independently of other characteristics, the eldest son would attend the best school. 
Therefore, we defined a dummy variable named Eldest, which is valued at 1 when 
the eldest son attends the best school or the most expensive school.  
 The literature regarding household choice also emphasizes the importance of 
income. We expect that high incomes families are not restricted in their choice of 
schools, so it would be feasible that they would not differentiate between children 
and would send them to similar quality schools. We also used ranges of household 
income provided by the survey of households of students who took the SIMCE.   
 The aforementioned variables do not directly involve the relative aptitude of 
the children. When the capabilities of siblings are different, households face an 
important decision. For example, households may use school choice as a mechanism 
to level the potential heterogeneity of future income between siblings. In this case, 
they would send the less capable child to the best school. On the other hand, if 
there are inter-personal transferences within the family, additional efficiency would 
drive a different choice, sending the most capable child to the best school.  
The operational definition and measurement of capability is complex, 
particularly in the absence of information, such as the case we researched. The 
absolute results on standardized tests present a problem since they not only solely 
reflect student ability but also the interaction of the innate ability with the 
contribution of the school for the resulting achievement of the student. Therefore, 
students with identical abilities who go to different schools will have different 
results due to the school they attended. A substantially better approximation is to 
consider the situation of each child in the result of the standardized test (SIMCE) 
compared with the students in his/her grade. However, the relative position 
measured by the SIMCE has a problem since it is also influenced by the socio-
economical level of the class. Two siblings attending schools with different socio 
economic background are expected to be in different ranking places. To isolate this 
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effect, we first estimated the parameters of a traditional school performance 
equation, with independent variables such as family income, parent´s level of 
education, gender of child (these results are presented in the Appendix). From the 
residuals, which reflect deviations of the student performance (not explained by 
social-demographic variables), we built a class ranking more proper to obtain 
innate capacities. More precisely, the variable we used as relative ability is the 
ratio between the percentile of the sibling attending the best school and the sibling 
attending the worst school.   
In summary, the model for calculations is defined as:  
 , , ,ji j j i i
k
PR
Y f Dh M I u
PR
æ ö÷ç ÷= +ç ÷ç ÷çè ø  
where Yi is a dummy variable which is valued as 1 when the family has two 
siblings, and where sibling j, attends a school which is substantially better than 
sibling k; Dhj is a dummy variable which is valued as 1 if sibling j is male. M is a 
dummy that is valued as 1 if the sibling is the oldest, PRj/PRk is the ratio of the 
relative positions in school of children j and k. Ii is family income and ui is a 
measurement error. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (H1 favored child) 
 H1 H2 
 Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error 
Simce  290.2 56.15 284.1 56.65 
Payment US$ 121 126,9 66.4 105.6 
Ranking* 47.1% 29.0% 45.2% 28.8% 
% Male 47.1% 44.5% 
% Eldest 49.9% 41.2% 
* % superior in cohort 
   
 Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics, first considering differences in 
tuition (column 1) and then differences in performance (column 2). The size of the 
sample varies, depending on the loss of data related to the dependent variables. 
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Our database includes 8500 households so we counted twice as many children. H1 
indicates the school which is more costly or has higher performance, and H2 is the 
least expensive or with the worst performance. Therefore, H1 is the “most 
privileged sibling” within the family, and we observe that the “most privileged 
sibling” has the highest SIMCE score, is ranked better within his grade level and is 
likely to be male and the eldest child.  
The probit model estimates allow us to isolate the impact of each of the 
variables on the probability that a family chooses to send their children to different 
schools, with results considering resources spent on school (column 2) and the 
performance results of standardized tests (column 1) are shown in table 2 .  
 
Table 2 
Probability that the Family Favors one Sibling (marginal coefficients) 
(Probit model, 1 Differences by type) 
Variable Diference in Simce Difference in Payment 
Male 
Eldest 
Income 
Income2 
Relatively most capable 
 
 
0.04 
0.454 
0.0006 
-0.0000027 
0.0022 
(0.011) 
(0.013) 
(0.0003) 
(0.000001) 
(0.00082) 
0.224  
0.422 
0.002 
-0.0000077 
0.0021 
(0.011) 
(0.014) 
(0.0003) 
(0.000001) 
(0.0009) 
Observations 
F (6,8604) 
Pseudo R²  
8,499 
144.7 
0.07 
8,614 
223.7 
0.071 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
These results indicate that whilst the model accounts for a small percentage 
of the variance, in accordance with the hypothesis from human capital theories all 
the variables are statistically significant and show the expected sign. Specifically, it 
is more likely that a male child or the eldest child attends the best school and it is 
likely that the most “talented” children go to the best schools. We also found that 
income had a non-linear effect on the probability that a family would favor one of 
the siblings. The “bias” effect is significant only in the middle income range and 
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disappears in the higher income range. Finally, it is worthy to note that the two 
measurements of quality – tuition and performance – show similar results, which 
suggests that the family´s understanding of quality is consistent with the definition 
used by decision makers of public policy.  
   
6 Conclusions 
 
We built a database which allowed us to obtain information regarding intra-family 
decisions with respect to school choice for pairs of siblings. The literature indicates 
that there are important trade-offs in the decision to invest in the human capital of 
children, measured as more years of education and nutrition; our results concurred, 
however they provide some additional information. Decisions regarding school 
quality, beyond just coverage or years of schooling, are also considered to be an 
investment in human capital which will impact the ability of individual members 
to generate income. The results suggest that there are biases which favor the 
education of males and the eldest child, which is consistent with a view of 
efficiency. These differences may be explaining at least part of the gender bias in 
learning. Finally, regarding the effect family choice has on income distribution, we 
found that families favor the education of the most capable children within the 
family, which may increase the differences in future income generated by each of 
the family members.  
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Appendix 
Academic Performance (OLS) 
 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 192.1 .3211232 
Income .0000436 7.53e-07 
Income2 -1.27e-11 3.05e-13 
Father schooling 1.606174 .0330804 
Mother Schooling 2.343936 .0334885 
Private School 32.11371 .4693188 
Private Subsidized 8.410537 .1952176 
   
R2 0.23; number of observations: 241,796 
 
